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SHE COULD STEAL, BUT SHE COULD NOT ROB: 
PUNISHMENT INFLATION IN BURGLARY STATUTES 
NATIONWIDE 
 
Candace McCoy* and Phillip M. Kopp** 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Burglary affects the lives of more people than homicide, rape, or grand theft.  
Among serious felonies, burglary occurs most frequently, but because it very seldom 
involves bodily harm, burglary is less dangerous than most assaults.  The prevailing 
view is that burglary is a crime committed against the property of another involving 
entry into the home or other building, with intent to commit another separate crime 
while inside.1  Usually, that other crime is theft, but sometimes the other crime is 
violent assault if one or more people are present.  Upon arrest, the offender can be 
charged with both burglary and the crime committed during the burglary.  It is the fact 
that other crimes might occur after a burglar enters a building, and that those crimes 
might be violent, that probably accounts for the categorization of burglary as a violent 
offense even when no violence occurs.   
Yet the criminal law punishes for acts committed, not for acts that might have been 
committed, so the severity of the crime of burglary must spring from some 
characteristic of the actual crime that sets it apart from lesser ones.  Perhaps burglary 
 
*Candace McCoy, J.D., Ph.D. is Professor of Criminal Justice at the City University of New York, 
Graduate Center and John Jay College.  She has published widely in social science, policy, and law journals, 
as well as authoring books and a co-edited textbook.  A criminal justice generalist, she served as a Senior 
Research Associate at the United States Sentencing Commission when the federal guidelines first took effect, 
and most recently while on professional leave from CUNY served as the Director of Policy Analysis for the 
Inspector General for the New York Police Department.  Dr. McCoy is a member of the Ohio bar.  
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Review and the American Journal of Criminal Justice.  His current research focuses on the co-occurrence of 
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1 The United States Supreme Court has said: “[i]n listing those crimes, we have held, Congress referred 
only to their usual or (in our terminology) generic versions—not to all variants of the offenses.  
See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990).  That means as to burglary—the offense relevant in this 
case—that Congress meant a crime ‘contain[ing] the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry 
into . . . a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.’  Id.”  Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
2243, 2248 (2016).   
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is punished severely not because it may create an environment in which violence might 
occur, but because the property owner whose home and possessions have been invaded 
perceives the violation not only as a theft but as an invasion of privacy.  State statutes 
vary widely as to elements of the crime, but most include some statutory factor meant 
to account for the degree of invasion and any associated trauma.  For instance, 
distinctions are often drawn between whether the dwelling burglarized was occupied 
or not, whether the burglary occurred during the day or night, or whether the building 
was commercial or residential.  Whether the offender carried a weapon is another 
factor that links to threat to potential victims and degree of alarm they experience.2   
However, possessing a weapon during the burglary is usually covered by a separate 
statute or sentencing enhancement, and thus adds punishment in addition to that 
already inflicted for the burglary itself.  Apparently, legislatures determine the severity 
of burglary per se, not only by intrinsic facts such as the breaking and entering, but by 
victims’ perceptions. 
Considering that very few burglaries actually involve violence, that burglars very 
seldomly encounter homeowners, that additional charges can take account of particular 
circumstances such as the dangerousness that weapons evince, but that burglary 
involves an element of privacy invasion, the severity of burglary could be regarded as 
higher—but not much higher—than the severity of other types of property crimes.   
 Recent challenges to the residual clause of the federal Armed Career Criminal Act 
(“ACCA”) point in this direction.3  In Johnson v. United States,4 the Court held the 
clause to be unconstitutionally vague because it “leaves uncertainty about how much 
risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony”,5 and thus the clause suffers from 
“hopeless indeterminacy.”6  Johnson involved a felon convicted for possession of a 
firearm; he was a white nationalist possessing several semi-automatic guns and an AK-
24 rifle as well as a stockpile of ammunition.  The predicate felony, upon which 
application of the ACCA depended, was his prior conviction for possession of a short-
barreled shotgun.7  In an 8-1 holding, the Court soundly struck down the ACCA’s 
residual clause because it requires judges to imagine the riskiness of “an idealized 
ordinary case of the crime”8 and determine whether the current case fits it—an exercise 
fraught with subjectivity, offering no standard by which to know the actual 
dangerousness of the typical offense.   
In a rare move, the Johnson Court explicitly overturned the earlier case of James 
 
2 See infra Table 3.  
3 The residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2018), instructs a 
judge on how to recognize whether a prior crime was sufficiently dangerous to qualify as a “violent felony,” 
thus providing the predicate for imposing a heavier sentence.  Under that clause, the prior crime must have 
“involve[d] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another[.]”  Id. 
4 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).  
5 Id. at 2554. 
6 Id. at 2555. 
7 Id. at 2556. 
8 Id. at 2557. 
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v. United States,9 in which the ACCA’s residual clause had been upheld so as to apply 
the “violent felony” predicate to a prior conviction for attempted burglary.  The James 
Court had analyzed the question of whether an attempted burglary presents a risk of 
injury sufficient to meet the ACCA standard, according to “whether the risk . . . is 
comparable to that posed by its closest analog among the enumerated offenses—here, 
completed burglary[,]” and found that burglary’s risk of injury  met the ACCA 
standard.10  Specifically, the risk identified in burglary (and therefore also attempted 
burglary) was “the possibility of a face-to-face confrontation[.]”11  Although Johnson 
was not a burglary case, Johnson rejected James’ statement that all burglary is 
inherently risky, and thus opens inquiry into whether burglary should generally be 
regarded as a crime of violence.  This article presents the current state of expert 
knowledge on that question, showing that burglary standing alone is very seldom 
dangerous. 
More recent developments at the federal level point in this direction.  In 2018, the 
Supreme Court in Sessions v. Dimaya held 5-4 that the residual clause gives no 
guidance on how to determine whether an “ordinary case” of burglary is violent, 
therefore finding the clause to be unconstitutionally vague.12  The result was that a 
prior conviction for burglary did not trigger deportation under the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act.  Similarly, the United States Sentencing Commission removed the 
crime of burglary from its list of violent offenses in the 2018 revision of the federal 
Sentencing Guidelines.13   
States define the crime using the generic definitional base of “entry into a building 
with intent to commit a crime,”14 but there is wide variation among them as they add 
other targets of entry or specify particular crimes committed therein.  The Supreme 
Court wrestled with this variation in another challenge to the ACCA’s residual clause.  
In Mathis v. United States, the Court analyzed a “categorical approach” for 
determining whether the state burglary statute, under which the defendant had been 
previously convicted, correctly defined “burglary” so that it would count as a predicate 
felony triggering an ACCA 15-year additional prison term for the new conviction.15  
The categorical approach requires sentencing judges to “ask whether the elements of 
 
9 James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007). 
10 James, 550 U.S. at 203. 
11 Id. 
12 Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2018). 
13 Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2243 (2016). See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
4B1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).  Burglary is no longer listed as a crime that “has as an element the 
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” and the offense is no 
longer listed in subsection (2) as a crime of violence.  Id.  For background on the change, see UNITED STATES 
SENTENCING COMMISSION, NOTICE OF PROPOSED AMENDMENT, SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR UNITED 
STATES COURTS, 80 Fed. Reg. 49314 (proposed Aug. 17, 2015). 
14 For instance, N.Y. PENAL LAW §140.20 (Consol. 2019) states that “[a] person is guilty of burglary in 
the third degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime 
therein.” 
15 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2247-48.  
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the offense forming the basis for the conviction sufficiently match the elements of the 
generic (as commonly understood) version of the enumerated crime.”16  The relevant 
Iowa statute “lists alternative factual means by which a defendant can satisfy those 
elements,”17 the Court explained; specifically, the law states that burglary involves 
entry into a “building, structure, or land, water or air vehicle.”18  A person in Iowa who 
unlawfully enters a building or, for instance, an automobile or a boat, with intent to 
commit a crime there, would be guilty of burglary.  Mathis himself had burgled a 
house, rather than a vehicle, but Iowa’s broadening of the base definition of the crime 
so as to include targets other than the generic “building” or “structure” was sufficient 
for the Court to deny the application of an enhanced sentence under the ACCA.19 
Had Mathis burgled a car or boat, the case would have been easier.  The generic 
base category of what constitutes burglary would not have matched the category in the 
Iowa statute, so the ACCA would not have applied.  But the Court took the hard case, 
in which the part of the statute under which Mathis was convicted did indeed match 
the generic definition, and even then the Court refused to apply the ACCA 
enhancement.  Writing for the 6-3 majority, Justice Kagan stated, “[w]e have often 
held, and in no uncertain terms, that a state crime cannot qualify as an ACCA predicate 
if its elements are broader than those of a listed generic offense.”20  Her language 
indicated that the Court would not require federal judges to take on the onerous task 
of inquiring into the facts charged, and on which defendants were convicted, in state 
courts in order to determine appropriate sentences for each instant federal crime.  In 
his dissent, Justice Breyer opined that the task would not be too burdensome.21  In 
dicta, he noted that the Mathis decision would sharply narrow the capacity to apply the 
ACCA for prior burglary convictions because “many states have burglary statutes that 
look very much like the Iowa statute before us today.”22 
How Mathis may apply to the states is not yet clear.  Surely the case has greatly 
narrowed the applicability of the ACCA, but the ACCA is a federal “career criminal” 
sentencing enhancement with which, presumably, few state legislatures are concerned.  
However, the case does raise concerns that many state burglary statutes are puffy in 
scope and subject to challenge as inviting indeterminacy in sentencing.  The content 
analysis of all fifty states’ statutes, below, explains this.   
Perhaps of more concern to state legislators is the Dimaya Court’s determination 
 
16 Id. at 2245 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-01 (1990)). 
17 Id. at 2246.  
18 IOWA CODE § 702.12 (2019). 
19 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257. 
20 Id. at 2251. 
21 Id. at 2259 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
22 Id. at 2263. Specifically: Colorado, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
South Dakota, and Wyoming, as well as the Model Penal Code.  See infra Table 3 (depicting the wide breadth 
of the elements of burglary statutes in the fifty states).   
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that an “ordinary case” of burglary is not a crime of violence.23  Only additional acts 
such as assault or threatening with a weapon, which would constitute additional crimes 
in themselves, would render the events violent.  The trend in sentencing reform is to 
offer judges more options for sanctioning offenders whose crimes are not violent, and 
the question arises as to whether the substantive criminal law itself may benefit from 
similar attention.  In May 2017, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) approved a 
revision to the sentencing provisions of the Model Penal Code (“MPC”), expanding 
the punishments applied to felony offenses from three to five.24  To date, however, the 
ALI has not amended any relevant definitions or elements of crimes set out in its Model 
Penal Code to match these changes in recommended punishments.  At this point, 
legislators who look to the Model Penal Code for guidance in law reform may give 
renewed attention to each offense and its definition, and all the elements that comprise 
it, because there are more sentencing options to match these items more closely.  
Burglary is one such offense.  
This article delves into the law of burglary and what punishments are optimal for 
it.  It provides an overview of current burglary statutes nationwide and uses the ALI 
definition of burglary as a common starting point for comparing them.  Part I presents 
the results of recent empirical research about the incidence of violence in burglaries, 
reviews the literature on public perceptions of the severity of burglary compared to 
other felonies, and includes a discussion of severity from the victim’s perspective.  
Relying on the value of proportionality in retributive rationales for punishment, Part II 
builds on the empirical findings about relative crime severity to argue that neither 
utilitarian nor retributive justifications for high punishment for simple burglary are 
compelling.  Part III presents a content analysis of burglary statutes in all fifty states, 
noting commonalities and divergences in the elements of the crime and showing how 
punishment levels have become inflated for “garden variety” burglaries, in which no 
violence occurred and no weapon was used.  The empirical, philosophical, and 
statutory evidence all point to the need for many states to revise their burglary statutes, 
to support the Model Penal Code’s “modified retributivist” amendment of its 
sentencing code in 2017,25 and to urge the ALI to reconsider the degree of severity 
currently set out for the crime of burglary in its model statutes.  Bare burglary of an 
unoccupied building in which the felony crime to be committed there involved 
 
23 The case also challenged the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U. S. C. § 924(e) 
(2018).  Subsection (ii) of that clause specifically listed burglary as a crime presenting risk of physical harm to 
its victims, stating that the sentencing enhancement would apply if the case “is burglary, arson, or extortion, 
involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another.” § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  In Johnson, the Court had previously held the clause to be 
unconstitutionally vague, and Dimaya extended the Johnson reasoning to a case of burglary specifically.  
24 MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT § 6.02(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2017). 
25 See Kevin R. Reitz, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Plan for Revision, 6 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 525, 528 (2002) (explanation of a sentencing code which sets the upper limits of 
punishment according to retributive principles, but which looks to utilitarian factors to decrease punishment 
below those cardinal setpoints). 
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property and not violence—in other words, the most typical type of burglary and the 
“modal”26 felony crime—should be ranked as a crime only slightly more serious than 
theft.  If the building was occupied, the severity grade should increase, but not to the 
level evident in the statutes of many states nor in the current Model Penal Code.  Part 
IV outlines a recommended statute, using Model Penal Code structure, with simple 
burglary set as a fifth-degree felony and a fourth-degree felony if it occurred in a 
residence at night.  Any acts of violence would be charged as separate crimes and 
added to the burglary charges.  Amending the Model Penal Code to accord with these 
precepts would present the states a template for statutory reform. 
 
I. THE INCIDENCE OF VIOLENCE DURING BURGLARY AND 
SEVERITY OF BURGLARY COMPARED TO OTHER FELONIES 
 
Until recently, empirical inquiry into the occurrence of violence during burglary 
was limited.  In 1973, Conklin and Bittner explored the intersection of violence and 
“breaking and entering,” reporting that the majority (63.7%) of burglaries occurred at 
a home or residence27 and the minority (39%) occurred between 7 p.m. and 10 p.m.28 
and 43% on weekends.29  Most relevant was that across all types of burglary, only 
2.5% involved any contact between victim and offender.30  However, throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, legislatures steadily increased sentencing severity in all felony 
categories including burglary.   
In 1985, Rand explored the burglary-violence connection using data from the 
National Crime Survey, which included roughly 73 million incidents of household 
burglary.31  Only 12.7% of the burglaries occurred when a person was home—slightly 
higher than Conklin and Bittner’s finding—suggesting that most burglars seek to avoid 
contact.32  Violence occurred in 3.8% of all household burglaries, and within that 3.8%, 
39% were simple assaults, 23% were aggravated assaults, 28% were robberies, and 
10% were rapes.33  Rand also found that burglaries occurring when someone was home 
were more likely to be reported than were victim-absent or non-violent burglaries, 
suggesting that the true percentage of burglaries with no violence may be even higher 
than statistics record.34  In 1985, Rand’s findings were cited in the influential Supreme 
Court case of Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).  There, the Court referenced the 
low incidence of violence in crimes of burglary as evidence that Garner, the fleeing 
felon, was nonviolent, thus supporting the majority’s ruling that it was unconstitutional 
 
26 In statistics, the mode is a measure of central tendency that refers to the most commonly appearing 
score in a distribution.  Burglary is the most frequently occurring felony offense and is thus “modal.” 
27 John E. Conklin & Egon Bittner, Burglary in a Suburb, 11 CRIMINOLOGY 206, 212 (1973). 
28 Id. at 214. 
29 Id. at 215. 
30 Id. at 214. 
31 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN: HOUSEHOLD BURGLARY 1 (1985).  
32 Id. at 4 (Table 8). 
33 Id. at 4 (Table 9). 
34 Id. at 4. 
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for police to use deadly force to stop an unarmed, non-dangerous, fleeing burglary 
suspect.35 
These studies were not updated in the next two decades.  Along with other serious 
felonies, sentences for the crime of burglary increased during that period yet the 
elements of the crime were not deeply examined.  But in 2010, Catalano returned to 
the topic.36  Using National Crime Victims Survey data from 2003–07, in which an 
estimated 3.7 million burglaries occurred during each year of that period,37 the 
researcher found that in 27.6% of these incidents a household member was present, 
and that violence or threats of violence occurred in 7.2% of the total cases.38  This 
violence estimate was about double the percentage found in the earlier studies—but 
including the “threat” of violence in the count had pushed the percentage higher than 
those of the previous studies, which had counted only violent acts.  Catalano found 
that 65.1% of the burglaries were committed by someone known to the victims.39  This 
suggests that a great many victims may not necessarily be traumatized over the 
invasion of privacy alone, but may also be angry, or made to feel vulnerable, due to 
the breach of trust between people with whom they have some sort of relationship 
whether personal or professional.   
Similarly, Culp, Kopp, and McCoy used National Crime Victim Survey 
(“NCVS”), Uniform Crime Report (“UCR”), and National Incident Based Reporting 
System (“NIBRS”) data for the period 1998–2007 to examine the burglary-violence 
connection.40  They concluded that incidences of violence during burglaries varied 
from a high of 7.6% in cities to a low of 0.9% in rural areas of the United States.41  
Culp, Kopp, and McCoy also disaggregated their incidence of violence measure into 
occurrences of actual violence (2.7%), and incidents where offenders threatened 
violence or harm but did not actually engage in violent acts (4.9%).42  Finally, Culp, 
Kopp, and McCoy found that a victim was present (though not necessarily cognizant 
of the offender’s presence) during 26% of all burglaries recorded in the NCVS.43  More 
recently, Kopp updated the NCVS study to cover the years 2009–14, finding that 
violence or threats of violence occurred during 7.9% of all burglaries in the United 
States and that a household member was home or came home in about 27.5% of them.44  
 
35 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 2 (1985), IV.  
36 SHANNAN CATALONO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: 
VICTIMIZATION DURING HOUSEHOLD BURGLARY (2010). 
37 Id. at 1. 
38 Id. at 1 (Figure 1). 
39 Id. at 9. 
40 RICHARD F. CULP, ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE ET AL., IS BURGLARY A CRIME OF VIOLENCE?  AN 
ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL DATA 1998-2007 (2015). NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE REPORT NO. 248651: 2015. 
41 Id. at 29-32. 
42 Id. at 29 
43 Id. at 38. 
44 Phillip M. Kopp, Is Burglary a Violent Crime?  An Empirical Investigation of the Armed Career 
Criminal Act’s Classification of Burglary as a Violent Felony, 30(5) CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 663, 670-71 
(2019). 
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These findings are consistent with Catalano’s, and stand as the most recent portrait of 
the circumstances in which burglaries are committed in the USA.  
The fact that violence actually occurs in a very small percentage of all burglaries 
does not diminish the seriousness of the crime.  Breaking into the home of another 
person in order to commit another crime while there is a serious matter, and if violence 
does occur, it is a very serious matter.  Kopp’s analysis indicates that incidents during 
which a victim was physically attacked represented 4.35% of all burglaries during the 
six-year study period, with 2.5% (70.8% of the total who were attacked) resulting in 
injury.45  Half of these were cuts and bruises, 5.5% were puncture or penetration 
wounds, 4.4% were broken bones or teeth, and another 5.5% were injuries from rape 
or sexual assault.46   
These violent acts are all crimes in themselves and, likely, would have been 
charged as such, both separately from and in addition to the burglary.  The severity of 
the occurrences is reflected in the fact that the offender will be punished for both 
burglary and the violent crime associated with it. 
Logically and legally, the act of “breaking and entering” is one crime and the 
illegal act committed while inside—whether a crime against property or the person—
is another.  Yet the stand-alone burglary is punished severely on the assumption that it 
presents the danger of potential violence, a stance which conflates the burglary with 
violent crime and illogically inflates the burglary’s severity.  Under the age-old 
doctrine of actus reus, a person cannot be punished for committing a crime unless there 
was a criminal act, not merely the potential for one.  The potential for violence is not 
actual violence and thus cannot be punished, according to this reasoning. 
Accepting this argument, advocates of high punishment for non-violent burglars 
argue that it is justified not because burglary holds the potential for violence, but 
because the experience of being burglarized is more traumatic to victims than is the 
experience of a mere property crime.47  A malevolent stranger in the home is 
frightening and qualitatively more damaging to personal well-being than is a 
pickpocket on the street.  Punishment would be higher for the home invader because 
of this heightened personal violation, not because of a fuzzy possibility of violence.  
How high that punishment would be, however, must be decided in the context of all 
other serious crimes.  
Ranking crimes according to their severity, and assigning appropriate punishments 
for them, has been done at least since 1764 when Cesare Beccaria published the classic 
Dei deliti e delle pene (On Crimes and Punishments).48  Beccaria articulated a key 
principle underpinning any just sentencing system: a schedule of punishments should 
be codified by legislators and it must correspond proportionately to the level of crime 
severity.49  For judging the severity of a crime, he identified the two criterion that 
 
45 Id. at 672. 
46 Id. at 673 (The remaining cases, about 4%, were “other” types of injuries). 
47 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 31, at 1. 
48 CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 19-21 (Edward D. Ingraham trans., 2d 
ed. 1819) (1775).  
49 Id. at 44-46. 
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generally come to mind—the extent of harm the crime causes and the intent of the 
perpetrator—criteria that continue to animate modern criminological debate.50  But in 
Beccaria’s view, the degree of harm done by crime was the only true measure of its 
severity: “[t]he foregoing reflections authorize me to assert that crimes are only to be 
measured by the injury done to society.  They err, therefore, who imagine that a crime 
is greater or less according to the intention of the person by whom it is committed.”51 
Beccaria argued that intent was so personal a matter that overreliance on it as a 
factor in determining punishment would necessitate “not only a particular code for 
each citizen, but a new law for every crime.”52  Nevertheless, the intent of the 
perpetrator has survived to be included, along with the perceived harm to the victim, 
in modern notions of crime severity.53  
In the modern era, the seminal work in developing a scale of crime seriousness, 
and the research upon which sentencing guidelines in the United States were first 
based, was Sellin and Wolfgang’s (1964) The Measurement of Delinquency.  The 
Sellin-Wolfgang index measures three components of a criminal event: the level of 
personal injury, the presence of threat or intimidation, and the value of property 
damaged, stolen, or destroyed.54  These components were drawn not from general 
theory but from asking justice professionals and members of the public what they 
thought should be the most important factors in deciding the severity of criminal 
punishment.  Their study was based on a series of surveys of judges and police in 
Philadelphia and college students at the University of Pennsylvania.  Beginning with 
a list of 141 offenses, respondents ranked offenses on an eleven-point seriousness scale 
and estimated the seriousness magnitude of fifteen crime scenarios.55  Based on the 
ratings and magnitude estimates, the researchers developed differential weights of 
seriousness that ranged from a low of one (a minor injury accompanying an assault) to 
a high of twenty-six (when someone is killed during a criminal incident).56   Sellin and 
Wolfgang found remarkably high levels of consensus on crime seriousness, regardless 
of group membership—cops and college students, for example, were in general 
agreement when scaling crime severity.57  This seminal research undercut the 
assumption that burglary should be codified as a violent crime because the public 
regards it as potentially so.  In these surveys of justice, professionals and members of 
the public did not rank burglary as a crime of violence. 
 
50 Id. at 47. 
51 Id. at 33. 
52 Id. at 47. 
53 Using the element of intent for ranking the seriousness of a crime is different from the legal 
requirement that intent (mens rea) be proven for every offense committed in order to assign criminal 
responsibility. 
54 T. SELLIN, & M. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY (1964); but see Alfred Blumstein, 
Seriousness Weights in an Index of Crime, 39 AM. SOC. REV. 854 (1974) (critiquing the Sellin-Wolfgang 
index). 
55 See id. at 236-258 (discussing of the study’s theoretical foundation and methodology). 
56 Id. at 298. 
57 See id. at 319-33 (discussing of the validity and reliability of the study’s measures). 
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Any sentencing system must take account of all crimes in relation to each other, 
not in theoretical isolation.  The early research on how the public perceives the severity 
of crimes grew more detailed, encompassing many circumstances of each type of crime 
and moving beyond surveys into analysis of actual crimes committed.  Heller and 
McEwan used the Sellin-Wolfgang index to score approximately 10,000 individual 
crimes committed in St. Louis during a two-month period in 1971.58  Their aggregated 
scores, tabulated by offense type, were as follows: 
 
Offense Severity Ranking of  
UCR Part I Offenses59 
Homicide 33.29 
Rape 15.33 
Aggravated Assault   9.74 
Robbery   6.43 
Burglary   2.64 
Auto theft   2.29 
Larceny (of over $50)   2.26 
 
The sharp drop in severity ranking between robbery and burglary is instructive.  
The first four crimes are clearly crimes against the person, but the fifth on the list 
(burglary) is scored roughly equivalent to the serious thefts (Auto theft and Larceny), 
with burglary’s slightly higher score (only .35 higher than larceny on a scale ranging 
from 2.2–33.3) attributable to some perception of added seriousness—potential for 
violence?  Invasion of privacy?  There is a clear demarcation between the crimes 
against the person and the serious property crimes, the group of crimes all ranked at 
around a score of 2.  Burglary is in the latter group.   
 Note the sharp distinction drawn between robbery and burglary.  The former 
involves violence or threat of it in order to obtain money.  The latter, arguably, involves 
the same.  But the distinction is that robbery traumatizes the victim directly and 
personally, whereas burglary invades a victim’s personal space.60  According to Heller 
and McEwan’s research, the public understands this difference well and, when asked 
to rank crime severity in relation to all other crimes, clearly opines that the punishment 
for burglary should be less than that for violent crimes.  Another survey—this one in 
Baltimore—found that respondents ranked the severity of burglary relative to 140 
other crimes at the same levels as the St. Louis respondents had, regardless of their 
educational attainment, age, sex, race, or whether the respondent had been victimized 
in the past.61  Consistently, “crimes against persons and illegal drug selling are seen as 
 
58 Nelson B. Heller & J. Thomas McEwen, Applications of Crime Seriousness Information in Police 
Departments, 1 J. CRIM. JUST. 241 (1973). 
59 Id. at 246 (information taken from table 2). 
60 SELLIN & WOLFGANG, supra note 54, at 190-235.  The Sellin and Wolfgang index scores offenses 
based upon the type and extent of harm done, a main difference between person and property offense in the 
index is the infliction of bodily injury or threats of bodily injury by person offenses that is not posed by 
property offences. 
61 Peter H. Rossi et al., The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 39 
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especially serious offenses, compared to crimes against property” and burglary was 
regarded as a property crime.62   
In addition to serving as the rudimentary basis for developing sentencing 
guidelines in the 1980s, Sellin and Wolfgang’s 1964 index had guided the development 
of the comprehensive National Survey of Crime Severity.63  Relying on their survey 
methodology, census interviewers in 1977 asked more than 50,000 participants from a 
representative national sample to rate the seriousness of 204 offense descriptions.64  
These anecdotal scenarios ranged from the mild (“a person steals property worth $10 
from outside a building”) to the heinous (“a man forcibly rapes a woman; as a result 
of physical injuries, she dies”).65  The results of the survey were scaled to represent 
mean scores for each crime and a ratio score that, like the Heller and McEwan (1973) 
scale, suggests the perceived seriousness of any given type of crime relative to any 
other.  Mean scores (and ratio scores) ranged from a low of 5.39 (0.25) for a person 
under sixteen skipping school to a high of 1577.53 (72.10) for the bombing of a public 
building that kills twenty people.  The midpoint of severity in the survey was 
represented by an offense in which a victim is intentionally injured to the extent of 
needing to be treated by a doctor but not hospitalized—a mean score of 186.039 (8.5).  
How respondents scored burglarizing a residence depended on the value of goods 
taken, with a range from a low of 68.742 (3.2) ($100 in value taken—$350 in 2009 
dollars) to high of 210.012 (9.6) ($1000 in value taken—$3,540 in 2009 dollars).  
Burglary scored generally lower than crimes involving either threat of or actual injury.  
But in those scenarios in which violence occurred during the burglary, the extent of 
violence increased the index value exponentially.  For example, threatening with a 
weapon but not injuring scored 160.077 (7.3), a crime resulting in a hospitalization 
scored 261.435 (12.0), rape raised the score to 565.658 (25.8), and death of a victim 
was scored highest at 778.374 (35.6).66  
In all this research, the consistent finding is that the public views burglary as 
equivalent to property crimes.  When presented with vignette scenarios and asked to 
respond to them, people’s perceptions of burglaries are that the crime becomes more 
 
AM. SOC. REV. 224 (1974). 
62 Id. at 233.  A body of research confirmed that there is a high level of normative agreement across all 
social groups on crime seriousness.  As Hansel (1987) observes, among diverse groups sampled, be it 
prosecutors (Roth, 1978), non-American peoples (Hsu, 1973; Valez-Diaz & Megargee, 1970), or prison 
inmates (Figlio, 1975), there is general agreement on the scaling of crime seriousness.  See Mark Hansel, 
Citizen Crime Stereotypes—Normative Consensus Revisited, 25 CRIMINOLOGY 445 (1987); Jeffrey A. Roth, 
Prosecutor Perceptions of Crime Seriousness, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 232 (1978); Marlene Hsu, 
Cultural and Sexual Differences on the Judgment of Criminal Offenses: A Replication Study of the 
Measurement of Delinquency, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 348 (1973); Angel Velez-Diaz & Edwin I. 
Megargee, An Investigation of Differences in Value Judgments Between Youthful Offenders and Non-offenders 
in Puerto Rico, J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY AND POL. SCI. 549 (1970); Robert M. Figlio, The Seriousness of 
Offenses: An Evaluation by Offenders and Non-offenders, 66 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 189 (1975). 
63 MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, THE NAT’L 
SURV. CRIME SEVERITY 2 (1985). 
64 Id. at 43. 
65 Id. at 47-50 (Table 29). 
66 Id. at 43-47 
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serious as the value of property damaged, stolen, or destroyed increases, not because 
of a perception that it is a violent crime.  When violence occurs, it is viewed as an 
element of a more serious crime, such as robbery or assault.   
Nevertheless, criminal laws still often regard burglary without violence as a 
violent crime.  Perhaps legislators writing these laws and law enforcement officials 
applying them inflate the seriousness because they concentrate on individual cases that 
tend to present the most sensational facts rather than referring to typical cases that are 
more mundane and which, as a crime category, fall at the low end of felony severity 
scales.  If pressed to explain the inflation, supporters of heavy punishment state that 
even nonviolent burglars frighten homeowners,67 that the potential for violent 
encounters in occupied buildings is very high, and that victim fear and invasion of 
privacy should be taken into account by placing burglary in the violent crime category.  
Public opinion on punishment severity relies on popular conceptions of offender68 
blameworthiness and harm to the victim, but proponents of heavier punishments rely 
on a utilitarian calculus that quantifies values such as fear and loss, adding them into 
the equation of crime seriousness.   
Quantifying non-monetary costs of crime, such as victims’ trauma, and including 
them in a total measure of the cost of crime is the starting point in a cost-benefit 
analysis (“CBA”).  A CBA aims to compare the costs with the benefits of punishment 
by measuring the relative efficiencies of different programs aimed at preventing and 
controlling crime in order to determine optimum punishments.69  Crime and its 
consequences are obviously not market-traded commodities, so CBA valuation 
methods adopt proxy measures that can serve as stand-ins for non-market goods.70  A 
CBA establishes the costs of crime by examining both tangible and intangible expenses 
associated with criminal offenses.71  The benefits of a crime control measure are then 
determined by using this cost estimate and stating that if a crime control measure is 
known to have prevented the crime, the cost was averted and therefore does not appear 
in the “costs of crime” column when comparing measurable costs and benefits of crime 
reduction measures.72   
For instance, Cohen’s work in assessing the monetary consequences of crime 
presents a new way of measuring crime severity.73  Cohen estimated victim costs 
related to lost productivity, medical expenses, ambulance fees, mental health costs, 
property loss and damage, the costs of police and fire services, and quality of life 
changes across a range of crimes.74  The scale includes victim costs associated with 
 
67 H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 1, 3 (1984); see also S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 5 (1983). 
68 Armed Career Criminal Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 4639 and H.R. 4768 Before the Subcomm. on 
Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 9,12 (1986). 
69 Mark A. Cohen, The Monetary Value of Saving a High-Risk Youth, 14 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIM. (1998); 
John Roman, Can Cost-Benefit Analysis Answer Criminal Justice Policy Questions, and If So, How? 20 J. 
CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 257 (2004). 
70 JOHN K. ROMAN ET. AL, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND CRIME CONTROL 7 (2010). 
71 Id. at 33-47 
72 Id. at 41-73. 
73 MARK A. COHEN, THE COSTS OF CRIME AND JUSTICE (2005). 
74 Id. at 51-68. 
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ten types of crime: fatal crime, child abuse, rape and sexual assault, other assault or 
attempt, robbery or attempt, drunk driving, arson, larceny, burglary or attempt, and 
motor vehicle theft or attempt.  Only larceny, with an average victim cost of $370, has 
a lower monetary cost than burglary (average cost of $1,400).75  The cost-benefit 
methodology is not without its critics,76 but overall the somewhat surprising finding is 
that this alternative method for measuring crime severity produces a scale order very 
similar to that of surveys using scenarios and vignettes.  At the bottom of the felony 
severity indexes, burglary is above auto theft on the scale of severity produced by 
public surveys, but from the cost-benefit perspective burglary is considered even less 
serious than auto theft.  Thus, burglary is the least serious of all the ranked felonies. 
In sum, the question of whether burglary is a violent crime is conflated with the 
possibility that other unarguably violent crimes tend to be associated with it.   
 
II.  PROPORTIONALITY OF PUNISHMENT77 
 
Locke78 and Beccaria79 argued that, in order for society to function properly, it 
must have laws stating what actions are detrimental to it and corresponding sanctions 
for transgression of those laws.  The principles on which these punishments are based 
has been the subject of debate for centuries in the philosophy of ethics, because 
intentionally inflicting pain—whether physical or mental—on fellow human beings is 
difficult to justify as a moral action.  Utilitarian rationales (deterrence, rehabilitation, 
and incapacitation) justify punishment as a means of providing the greatest good for 
the greatest number80 under the premise that morality is to be found in the prevention 
of harm to many people at the expense of pain to one.  General deterrence is the most 
commonly-cited example; punishing one person instructs all others on correct 
behavior.  Specific deterrence aims to prevent the individual from repeating the 
behavior in the future.81  But not everyone can be deterred, so the utilitarian 
justifications for punishment can transition from deterrence to either rehabilitation or 
incapacitation depending on the actions and capacities of the offender.82 
Packer, in assessing rehabilitative punishment, found "very simply[,] that we do 
not know how to rehabilitate offenders[,] at least within the limits of the resources that 
 
75 Mark A. Cohen, Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Crime and Justice, 4 CRIM. JUST. 289 (1999). 
76E.g., John Roman & Graham Farrell, Cost-Benefit Analysis for Crime Prevention: Opportunity Costs, 
Routine Savings, and Crime Externalities, 14 CRIME PREVENTION STUD. 53, 62-63 (2002).  
77 In philosophy, proportionate punishment is called “retributive” rationales, though the word has 
acquired an unfortunate meaning aligned with “revenge” in contemporary debates.  Vengefulness is not a part 
of retributive reasoning; indeed, the proportionality principle that flows logically from the retributive rationale 
reins in vengeful, excessive punishment. 
78 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 49 (1689). 
79 BECCARIA, see supra note 48. 
80 See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION (1781). 
81 FRANCIS T. CULLEN & ROBERT AGNEW, CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY: PAST TO PRESENT 263-66 (2003). 
82 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 36-37 (1963).   
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are now or might reasonably be expected to be devoted to the task."83  This reality 
leads to societal frustration with offenders who repeat their crimes even after 
rehabilitative efforts.  Heavier controls then are applied, ostensibly in the name of 
“more rehabilitation.”  Eighteen years earlier, Allen had cautioned that "surprisingly 
enough, the rehabilitative ideal has often led to increased severity of penal measures . 
. . a clearly identifiable fruit of the rehabilitative ideal[,] is unmistakably in the 
direction of lengthened periods of incarceration . . . that are essentially incapacitative 
rather than therapeutic in character.”84  Unchecked, the direction of rehabilitative 
policies is towards incapacitation.  The "converse of the belief that an offender has 
been rehabilitated and is capable of living a crime-free life[,] and hence should be 
released from prison, is that he has not, is not, and should not."85   Punishment 
motivated by incapacitation restrains offenders, rendering them incapable of offending 
at least during the specified term of confinement.86  Thus, incapacitation is invoked as 
the justification for punishment most often in career and habitual offender laws and, 
as applicable, to offenders who have committed particularly serious crimes for which 
the risk to innocents is too great to allow.   
The severity of punishment inflicted under utilitarian rationales depends on the 
benefits to be gained.  Commenting on punishment as a deterrent to crime, Locke stated 
that violations of the law should be "punished to that degree, and with so much 
severity[,] as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to 
repent, and terrify others from doing the like."87  The utilitarian rationales have a built-
in proportionality principle; the punishment must fit the crime but not exceed it.  
Whether in the name of deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation, excessive pain 
inflicted on one person which does not benefit others is superfluous and costly.  
Locke’s statement sets out a proportionality principle for utilitarian punishments, 
but it is also congruent with deontological “just desert” rationales—for different 
reasons.  Utilitarian reasons for punishment aim to accomplish a crime-reduction goal 
at the least expense to the public, but retributive justifications are concerned only with 
the moral status of the blameworthy offender.  Rooted in the biblical lex talionis—the 
law of retaliation requiring “an eye for an eye” and “a tooth for a tooth”—retribution 
punishes offenders simply because they are morally responsible, having committed the 
crimes and not for general societal purposes.88  In simplest terms, offenders are 
punished because they deserve it.  They are moral actors who chose to hurt others and 
thus will suffer for it.  Retributive rationales for punishment do include some notion 
of social purpose because violations of the law are said to create an imbalance in the 
social order.  For instance, punishment would restore victims to their previous state, 
 
83 HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 55 (1968). 
84 Francis A. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIM’Y 226, 229 (1959).    
85 MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 
48-49 (2004). 
86 ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON THEORY AND POLICY 75 
(2009).  
87 LOCKE, supra note 78 at 12-14.   
88 PACKER, supra note 83 at 37. 
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insofar as this is possible.  Punishment restores the balance by erasing the unfair 
advantage gained through crime by removing ill-gotten benefits or removing the 
disadvantage the crime caused to victims.89 
In desert-based rationales, punishment is calibrated to match the severity of the 
actual harm caused and not some speculative benefit to others in the future.  In contrast 
to utilitarian justifications, a desert-based rationale is concerned only with the moral 
blameworthiness of the offender for past acts.  It would be wrong to punish a person 
more than deserved for doing the wrongful act, because each person is a moral agent 
who takes responsibility for his or her actions but cannot be expected to take 
responsibility for acts not actually done.  In this way, a proportionality principle is 
likewise built into retributive punishment “to that degree, and with so much severity”90 
that matches the harm done.  The harm component links to seriousness: it is the amount 
of physical, psychological, or monetary injury that the criminal act caused.  Von 
Hirsch, citing Richard Sparks, points out that the harmfulness of a crime should be 
based on empirical evidence and not solely on thoughts and beliefs, aptly giving the 
example that people "may believe that burglaries entail a greater likelihood of violence 
than in fact they do.”91 
Under the desert rationale, the calculation of harm is based only on what an 
offender has in fact done and not what he could have done, because to do otherwise 
would punish the offender more than deserved.  For example, an offense committed 
with a firearm causes greater fear and is therefore more harmful than an unarmed 
offense.  However, the presence of a firearm, while probably causing some degree of 
psychological injury to a victim, does not cause the same degree of injury that actual 
use of the firearm does.  Therefore, an offender who possesses a firearm deserves some 
modicum of punishment more than an unarmed offender, but much less punishment 
than an offender who physically injures someone.  Similarly, under cost-benefit 
calculus, a victim’s fear and upset at an invasion of privacy would figure into the 
equation as a cost, but since it is speculative, not readily measurable, and widely varied 
depending on the individual person experiencing it, the cost would be given some 
weight but not a great weight. 
The proportionality principle is most closely aligned with desert-based rationales 
for punishment.  After all, “an eye for an eye” signals retribution, but it also limits the 
amount of pain that may be inflicted on the offender.  Removing the eye of the person 
who removed yours is direct proportionality, which does not call for removing two 
eyes, or the whole head—solely “an eye for an eye.”  But utilitarian and cost-benefit 
approaches also aim for proportionality in practice, because they require that 
punishment achieve crime reduction; any degree of punishment inflicted above that 
necessary to reduce crime is costly and superfluous.  In explaining how it is possible 
 
89 See generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976); see also 
generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE 
SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS (1985); see also Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of 
Punishment, 16 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1992). 
90 LOCKE, supra note 78, at §12. 
91 ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE 
SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 65 (1985). 
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to design a sentencing system that relies on retributive proportionality principles to 
delimit the upper bound of permissible punishment for each offense type, while at the 
same time utilizing utilitarian considerations to lower the punishment below these 
ceilings, Reitz set out the structure of the Model Penal Code’s new sentencing rules.92   
Quoting Zimring and Hawkins, he states that: 
 “it is difficult to place a ceiling upon impulses of general incapacitation in 
the absence of a limiting principle derived from retributive theory (which the 
original Code eschewed) and without good empirical data of the thin crime 
avoidance that is actually won through such policies . . . Special attention 
should be focused upon the question of whether the same crime-reduction 
benefits can be expected from the lengthy confinement of violent criminals, 
property offenders, and drug law violators.” 93  
In sum, the law of burglary as currently found in the United States demands more 
punishment than is optimal under utilitarian principles.  Breaking and entering an 
occupied building with intent to commit a crime there, taken alone, is not so harmful 
to the general public that the “greatest happiness” would be served by overly lengthy, 
expensive imprisonment.  State statutes often delineate carefully between an act of 
burglary and an act of violence, but the sentencing laws might produce 
disproportionately lengthy prison sentences—even when the substantive criminal law 
carefully limits the definition of the crime to non-violent elements.  For instance, 
consider habitual offender laws, which increase sentencing length exponentially upon 
convictions for a second or third felony.  Which felonies are eligible for triggering the 
habitual offender sentencing enhancement?  Some states have attempted to prevent 
over-punishment from such laws by limiting eligible crimes to violent felonies,94 but 
these laws may include burglary as a violent felony for purposes of sentencing 
enhancements even if the substantive elements of the crime set out in the state statute 
clearly describe a non-violent offense.  The next section provides an overview of 
burglary laws in all the states.    
 
 
92 Kevin R. Reitz was the reporter for the American Law Institute’s (ALI) revision of the Model Penal 
Code.  In Reitz, supra note 25, he outlined the new sentencing structure for the Code prior to publication of 
the first round of black-letter proposals that, after discussion and revision, would become the tentative drafts of 
the revised Model Penal Code submitted for approval to the ALI membership. 
93 Reitz, supra note 25 at 555 (Quoting FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF 
IMPRISONMENT, Ch. 4 (1991)).      
94 For example, see New Jersey’s No Early Release Act N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.2 (West 1997).  The 
felony convictions eligible for enhancement upon conviction of a third felony are: murder, aggravated 
manslaughter or manslaughter, vehicular homicide, second degree aggravated assault, disarming a law 
enforcement officer, kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, other specific sexual assaults, robbery, carjacking, 
aggravated arson, extortion, booby traps in manufacturing or distribution facilities, strict liability for drug 
induced death, terrorism, producing or possessing chemical weapons, biological agents or nuclear or 
radiological devices, racketeering . . . and second-degree burglary.  As in the Model Penal Code, second-
degree burglary in New Jersey involves a burglary in which the offender caused or threatened bodily harm or 
carried and/or used a deadly weapon. 
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III.  RETHINKING STATUTORY LAW ON BURGLARY 
Under common law, “the crime of burglary consisted of a breaking and entering 
of a dwelling house of another in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony 
therein.”95  Content analysis of American states’ burglary statutes shows that modern 
burglary statutes are generally broader than the common law definition—often 
dropping the requirement that entry into the house must have been forced, expanding 
the definition of target beyond residential property, and not limiting the time of the 
criminal act to the nighttime hours.  In its simplest form, the definition of burglary has 
not traditionally indicated that the illegal act must involve violence against a person, 
but the circumstances listed in various state statutes indicate that the risk of potential 
violence seems to influence legislators’ thoughts on the crime’s severity.  Although 
the behavioral (actus reus) elements of burglary vary among jurisdictions, the 
cognitive (mens rea) element of “intent to commit a felony therein” is constant.   
State statutes and the Model Penal Code categorize the various circumstances of 
burglaries into severity levels, “grades” or “degrees.”  The severity, and in turn the 
potential penalty associated with the crime, increases from simple burglary to 
aggravated burglary depending on the circumstances listed, which vary among 
jurisdictions.  The Model Penal Code (“MPC”) sets the level of a simple burglary, 
without more, as a felony of the third-degree.  But if the burglary occurs “in the 
dwelling of another at night,” and/or if the actor purposely, knowingly, or recklessly 
inflicts bodily injury upon another, and/or is armed with explosives or a deadly 
weapon, the crime rises to the level of a second-degree felony.  Moreover, such 
elements may be charged as separate violent felonies depending on what happened 
during the course of the crime.  Section 221.1(2) of the Code states: 
 
 
(2) Grading.  Burglary is a felony of the second degree if it is perpetrated in 
the dwelling of another at night, or if in the course of committing the 
offense, the actor: 
 (a) purposely, knowingly or recklessly inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily 
injury on anyone; or 
 (b) is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon. 
Otherwise burglary is a felony of the third degree.96 
 
Thus, the Model statute regards the act of breaking and entering a building to be 
inherently more serious if the structure was a dwelling,97 or if the additional crime 
committed after entry is a crime of violence, rather than a property crime such as theft.  
Convicting the defendant in the more severe category has consequences for sentencing, 
 
95 Burglary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). 
96 MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
97 Note the narrowed applicability of the Model Penal Code’s “dwelling” requirement; the crime must 
have occurred at night in order to raise the seriousness level.  Id. 
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such that punishment would increase depending on the particular state’s statute 
covering the difference between second98 and third-degree burglary.99 
A separate issue is whether to charge all related crimes or to subsume them under 
the burglary charge.  The thorny puzzle is how to take account of various 
circumstances under which the crime is committed without double-counting an 
element both in the burglary and the separate crime committed during it.  Section 
221.1(3) of the Model Penal Code addresses the question of whether a burglary charge 
at the higher level (second-degree) would subsume any charge for the separate crime 
committed while in the dwelling.  It states: 
(3) Multiple Convictions.  A person may not be convicted both for burglary 
and for the offense which it was his purpose to commit after the burglarious 
entry or for an attempt to commit that offense, unless the additional offense 
constitutes a felony of the first or second degree.100 
Therefore, if the separate crime was a property crime, such as theft, which is the most 
typical situation, the theft “washes out” and the offender is sentenced only for a 
burglary (at the level of second-degree if the theft was from a home, otherwise at third-
degree).  Clearly, under the Model statute there is a decisive difference in punishment 
severity between a burglary ending in theft and a burglary ending in violence.  But it 
is also clear that the MPC does not regard all burglaries as violent.  Nevertheless, 
inflation occurs because the fact of violence not only raises the crime from second to 
third-degree, but the separate charge for the violent act itself is added on. 
If the separate crime was a violent felony ranging from assault to homicide, the 
additional charge will be added to the indictment, and punishment following 
conviction for the separate charge will be added to the punishment which was already 
set at the level of second-degree for the burglary charge.  In this example, the 
punishment inflation is not controlled.  First, the Model Penal Code raises the level of 
severity to second-degree if violence or attempt at violence occurred (or if a deadly 
 
98 Upon conviction of a second-degree felony, the 1962 Model Penal Code § 6.07(2) specified “a term 
the minimum of which shall be fixed by the Court at not less than one year nor more than five years, and the 
maximum of which shall be fixed by the Court at not less than ten years nor more than twenty years.”  MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 6.07(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1962).  In the new 2017 version, the ceiling is twenty years, which 
could be lowered depending on rehabilitative, deterrent, or incapacity factors the court decides apply to the 
case, potentially (though not likely) down to a sentence of probation;  See generally MODEL PENAL CODE: 
SENTENCING, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT § 6.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2017).  The Code provides guidance as to 
factors that would justify lowering the sentence.  The Code contemplates a state sentencing structure of 
guidelines sentencing rather than indeterminate ranges affected by parole determinations averaging one-third 
of the prison term imposed. 
99 Upon conviction of a third-degree felony, the 1962 Model Penal Code § 6.07(3) specified “a term the 
minimum of which shall be fixed by the Court at not less than one year nor more than three years, and the 
maximum of which shall be fixed by the Court at not less than five years nor more than ten years.”  MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 6.07(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1962).  In the new 2017 version, the ceiling is ten years, which could 
be lowered depending on factors as described in note 50. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, PROPOSED 
FINAL DRAFT §6.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2017). 
100 MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(3)) (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
 
  
 Journal of Legislation 19 
weapon was present), but such violent “felony of the first or second degree” does not 
wash out.  Next, double-counting—or inflation of the severity level, as an alternate 
way of regarding this dynamic—occurs because the Model Penal Code both raises the 
level of severity to second-degree, and also allows indictment on the additional charge 
of a crime of violence, attempted violence, or possession of a weapon. 
The Model Penal Code is exactly that: a model, not an actual statute.  Laws about 
burglary in the fifty states and the federal jurisdiction vary, and many do not use the 
severity grading system set out in this model.  However, taking as a starting point the 
assertion that simple burglary is a crime against property and not the person, and 
acknowledging that the circumstances under which it is committed can increase its 
perceived severity, proportional punishment would require careful parsing of each 
circumstance as well as delineating when related crimes will be charged separately or 
should be subsumed under the charge of simple burglary.  As with the Model Penal 
Code, state statutes wrestle with the inflation problem.  A content analysis of the 
criminal codes of all fifty states and the District of Columbia, as well as federal 
statutes, shows wide variation on these matters. 
We conducted a LexisNexis search from July 1, 2018–July 5, 2018 on all burglary 
statutes using the search terms "burglary," "breaking and entering," and "home 
invasion," in addition to scanning the respective codes’ table of contents.  Once 
identified, the burglary statutes were categorized according to the various elements 
they included, producing a comprehensive listing of each type of statute and variations 
by state.  For instance, definitions of key terms used in the statutes, i.e. what type of 
structure is eligible for being counted as a target of burglary, or how serious the crime 
committed once inside the structure must be, vary among the states.  Once all the 
statutes had been identified and compiled, they were coded according to the following 
variables: 
 
● State, statute number, and the elements that constitute the offense.  Variations 
in how severe one offense is regarded compared to another is presented using the 
following schema: 
▪ What constitutes the offense of burglary? 
▪ Act 
▪ Intent 
▪ What elements alter the severity of the offense? 
▪ Grade (severity of offense in comparison to all other 
crimes) 
▪ Degree (severity of offense the offender intended to 
commit once inside the structure) 
▪ Dwelling/Occupancy (whether the targeted structure 
must be a dwelling to constitute an element of burglary 
and its occupancy status) 
▪ Time of Day 
▪ Injury (did offender injure or attempt to injure anyone?) 
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▪ Weapons (did offender threaten, become armed, was 
armed, or use any weapons—classified as dangerous, 
deadly, or explosive?)  
 
Definitions.  Alternatively labeling this criminal act as burglary, breaking and entering, 
entering without breaking, housebreaking and in some jurisdictions home invasion, 
there is a good deal of consensus among the states as to the elements of this crime.  
Table 1 shows the results of the statutory content search. 
Table 1: Act Required to Satisfy Statutory Definition of Burglary by State 
Act f  State 




19 CA, FL, GA, ID, IA, KS, 
LA, MN, NM, NV, ND, 
OH, OK, PA, SC, SD, 
TN, TX, VT 
 




Enter or Remain 
Unlawfully 
11 AK, AZ, AR, CT, NH, 
NJ, OR, UT, WA, WI, 
WY 
 
Knowingly Enter or 
Remain Unlawfully 
 
5 DE, HI, IL, MT, NY 
Knowingly and 
Unlawfully Enter or 
Remain Unlawfully 
 
3 AL, CO, KY 
Knowingly and 





Break and Enter 11 DC, IN, MD, MA, MI, 
MS, NE, NC, RI, VA, 
WV 
 
Looking first at the “physical presence and intent” elements, it is apparent that in 
a third of the states (N=19), simply entering or remaining in any structure satisfies the 
behavioral requirement of burglary.  Eleven states (N=11) add that the actor must have 
entered or remained in the structure unlawfully, while an additional ten states (N=10) 
require the actor to have entered, and/or entered and remained, both unlawfully and 
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knowing that this act was unlawful.  In contrast, a smaller number (N=11) of states 
maintain the common law wording of the offense as requiring the act of breaking and 
entering.  Entering without breaking, for instance walking through an open door, would 
not fall under this wording in those eleven states, but any act requiring a physical push 
on the structure, such as opening an unlocked door or window, universally counts as 
“breaking.”  
The element of intent is presented in Table 2.  In over half the states (N=30), the 
requirement is met when the actor entered or remained with the intent to commit any 
crime once inside.  Seventeen states (N=18) narrow the applicable offenses by 
requiring that the actor intended to commit either a theft or a felony after entering.  
 
Table 2: Act Required to Satisfy Statutory Definition of Burglary by State 
Intent f                               State 
Any Crime 30 AL, AK, CO, CT, DE, DC, FL, HI, KY, ME, 
MD, MN, MS, MO, MT, NH, NJ, NY, MD, 
OH, OK, OR, SC, SD, UT, VT, VA, WA, 
WV, WI 
Any Felony 3 AR, KS, PA 
Felony or 
Theft 
18 AZ, CA, GA, ID, IL, IN, IA, LA, MA, MI, 
NE, NV, NM, NC, RI, TN, TX, WY 
 
Breadth of statutory classifications.  Combining the behavioral and intent 
elements of the various definitions of burglary, it is apparent that, generally, the most 
basic or simple burglary occurs when the actor enters or remains in a structure with 
the intent to commit any crime therein.  This general definition then varies among the 
states depending on what additional elements the state’s legislature chooses to add.  In 
discussing the content of the provisions of burglary laws in all the states, one way to 
present the wide variety of provisions is to ask the reader to conceptualize the 
population of potential offenders who might be classified as burglars and then imagine 
narrowing that population by adding additional factors, which must be proven in order 
for the act to constitute a burglary.  For example, the broadest definition, as stated here, 
would be narrowed by adding factors such as “the crime committed must be a felony” 
or “the structure must be occupied.”  In the content analysis presented below in Table 
3, the laws of each state are arranged on a rough scale of “broadest to narrowest” 
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Table 3: Burglary Grading Patterns by Type of Structure/Occupancy and 
State (broadest to narrowest) 
f Simple Aggravated 
1 
State      
1 Any                                  NE  
4 Any Dwelling AK, CA, HI, OR  
4 Any Occupied KS, PA, MO, WI  
2 Any Occupied 
Dwelling 
DC, OK  
2 Any Dwelling at 
Night 
NH, ND  
4 Any Any* ID, MT, NJ, WY  




State   
2 Any Non-
Dwelling 
Dwelling AL, NY  
5 Any Dwelling Any* KY, ME, NM, UT, WA  
1 Any Dwelling Occupied 
Dwelling 
AR  





Any* FL  
1 Any Unoccupied* Occupied * IA  
3 Any Dwelling Dwelling * NV, SC, TN  
1 Any Occupied Occupied * SD  
1 Any Occupied Occupied 
Dwelling 
LA  
 Any Dwelling Dwelling at 
Night 
WV  






State   
1 Any Dwelling Non-
Dwelling* 
Dwelling * AZ  
1 Any Dwelling Any* Any* CO  







1 Any Dwelling Dwelling * Dwelling * MD  










1 Any Dwelling* Churches Dwelling MS  










1 Any Any* Dwelling Occupied 
Dwelling* 
VT  
1 Any Any* Dwelling Any* VA  








State   





1 Any Dwelling Any* Dwelling * Dwelling * IN  
1 Any Occ 
Dwelling* 
Unoccupied Occupied Occupied* OH  































































Dwelling * Dwelling * RI 
* Increase in severity of offense based upon other statutory element (Weapon, Victim, Injury, Intent…) 
  
 Journal of Legislation 23 
 
 Degrees of burglary.  Only one state (Nebraska) recognizes simple non-violent 
burglary in its criminal code, while the remaining forty-nine states and the District of 
Columbia (N=50) use additional elements to differentiate between non-violent 
(simple) and serious (aggravated by some type of violence or risk factor) burglary.  
Factors that could render the act “aggravated” include: the type of the structure, 
whether it was occupied, the presence of a weapon, or injury to a victim.  
The criteria most often used to differentiate simple from aggravated burglary is 
the type of structure targeted (Table 3), specifically whether the structure must be a 
dwelling or residence—a “dwelling” being any structure traditionally or actually used 
for lodging.  In 80 percent of the states (N=43) burglary of a non-dwelling, whether 
occupied or not, constitutes simple burglary, while entering a dwelling (again, whether 
occupied or not) increases the severity of the offense from a simple to aggravated 
offense.  Five states classify burglaries of either schools (Illinois), churches (Illinois, 
Mississippi North Carolina), public buildings (Minnesota), businesses (Virginia), or 
banks and pharmacies (Minnesota) as aggravated offenses. 
In contrast, Kansas, Missouri, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Wisconsin (N=6), 
limit simple burglary to unoccupied structures and aggravated burglary to occupied 
structures, whether they are dwellings or other buildings.  Other states (N=14) use 
varied combinations of structure type and occupancy to differentiate simple and 
aggravated burglaries.  Finally, six states (N=4) do not use structure type or occupancy 
to discern variants of burglary at all, instead regarding elements of violence that 
increase the risk of injury or potential injury to victims as the aggravating factor— no 
matter the structure type or its occupancy status.  
Whether broadly or narrowly, once the crime of burglary is defined, the next step 
is to determine its degree of severity.  The clearest divide between simple and 
aggravated burglary is not between type of structure, or its occupancy status, but 
whether physical violence occurred or was threatened (Table 4).  In no state, or in the 
District of Columbia, does simple burglary include an element of violence, while all 
but eleven states include one or more elements of violence in their aggravated burglary 
statutes.   
Among state statutes providing for an aggravated severity level, if the burglary 
was violent, definitions of what constitutes violence vary.  In many states, the presence 
of a dangerous or deadly weapon—and whether the actor used it (N=28) or simply 
threatened its use it (N=10)—elevated the offense to aggravated burglary.  In seventeen 
states (N=18) possessing explosives at the time of the offense also increased the 
severity from simple to aggravated.  In eleven states, causing injury to another through 
any means increased the severity of burglary, while twenty states (N=20) widen the 
number of cases regarded as severe by including the attempted injury of another as 
well as an actual injury as the divider between simple and aggravated burglary.  
Harkening back to the common law definition of burglary, eight states increase the 
severity of the offense when it occurs at night.  
Finally, the offender’s intent serves to vary the degrees of burglary in thirteen 
states.  In Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Virginia (N=5) offense 
severity decreases when the offender intends to commit a misdemeanor, while 
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Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana, Maryland, and Texas (N=5) elevate the offense 
when the offender seeks to commit a violent offense.  In Colorado and Texas, offense 
severity increases if the intent of the actor is to steal drugs. Connecticut elevates the 
severity of burglary when the offender’s goal is theft of firearms, while Iowa raises the 
degree of seriousness of burglaries in which the perpetrators’ intent is to commit a sex 
offense. 
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Table 4: Statutory Elements used to Elevate Severity of Burglary by State 
Weapons f State 
Threaten Use 10 AK, AR, CO, CT, IL, KY, NY, OR, SC, UT 
Armed 28 AL, AZ, DE, FL, GA, HI, IN, IA, LA, ME, MA, MI, 
MN, MS, MT, NV, NH, NJ, NM, ND, OH, OK, SD, 
VT, VA, WA, WI, WY 
   
Explosives   
Threatens Use 1 MN 
Armed 18 AL, AZ, CO, CT, DE, FL, ID, IA, KY, MS, MT, 
NH, NJ, NY, ND, OH, SC, UT 
   
Injury   
Attempt/Assault 20 AK, AR, CO, CT, FL, HI, IL, ME, MA, MN, MS, 
MT, NJ, ND, OH, OR, SD, WA, WI, WY 
Injury/ Battery 11 AL, DE, IA, KY, LA, NH, NM, NY, SC, TN, UT 
Serious Injury 1 IL 
   
Time of Day   
Nighttime 8 MA, NH, ND, RI, SC, SD, VA, WV 
   
Criminal Intent   
Misdemeanor 5 GA, MD, MA, MN, VA 
Drugs 2 CO, TX 
Firearms 1 CT 
Sex Crime 1 IA 
Violence 5 CT, DE, LA, MD, TX 
Trespass 1 OH 
   
Victim    





IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE 
The lyrics of an old Beatles song explain the mindset of most burglars: “she could 
steal but she could not rob.”101  Nevertheless, the offender “came in through the 
bathroom window,” as the song says, and many victims will feel violated.102  They 
will very seldom be physically harmed though, and to regard burglary as a violent 
crime—especially when separate charges for the violent acts are prosecuted in 
addition to the burglary charge—is to inflate the seriousness of this modal felony. 
 
101 THE BEATLES, She Came In Through the Bathroom Window (EMI Studios 1969). 
102 Id.  
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Common law equated burglary with unlawful entry into a dwelling, probably 
regarding a burglar as a person who would be willing to commit violence against any 
person at home, and thus considered more dangerous than a thief in the barn who 
would encounter only the livestock.  But, relying on contemporary evidence that 
burglars are very seldom violent even in homes, the 2018 revision of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines removed the “dwelling” element.103  In 2015, the Guidelines 
had read:  
 
§4B1.2.Definitions of Terms Used in Section 4B1.1 
(a) The term "crime of violence" means any offense under federal or state 
law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that – 
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person of another, or 
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves the use of 
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential 
risk of physical injury to another.104   
 
The 2018 revisions to the Sentencing Guidelines removed burglary from this list 
altogether.  But they retained the exact language of subsection (1) so that, in any case 
in which violence was actually used, attempted, or threatened, the crime would be 
classified as violent.  Accordingly, the mere fact of entry into a dwelling is insufficient 
to constitute a serious offense, but actual physical force, or threats of it, serve to boost 
the crime into the most serious category.105  
Sentencing reform might not be as legislatively simple to achieve at the state 
level.  “Offense severity inflation” is apparent in this content analysis of state burglary 
statutes, but it arises from diverse elements in different states.  State laws do, however, 
generally differentiate between two types of burglary: simple and aggravated.  
Despite the fact that three-fourths of burglaries involve unoccupied buildings,106 these 
simple burglaries are included in most state statutes as aggravated felonies.  In the 
one-fourth of burglaries involving occupied buildings, the likelihood of violence is 
very small107—and if physical violence does occur, additional crimes of violence are 
also prosecuted and criminal charges for possessing or using a weapon are also added 
on, if applicable.  For example, in an incident where an offender enters a structure, 
commits theft, encounters a victim, and causes injury that results in four days 
hospitalization, the offender may be charged not only with burglary (for entering with 
intent to commit felony), but also robbery (for the theft and causing fear or injury), 
and aggravated assault (for the extent of injury to the victim).  The victim in this 
example thus sees that punishment is severe for offenders who have actually engaged 
in violent acts or who were clearly willing to do so, as evidenced by possession of a 
 
103 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 4B1.2. 398 (Nov. 2018). 
104 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 4B1.2. 395 (Nov. 2015). 
105 See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598 (discussing the possible categorization of burglaries).   
106 Kopp, supra note 44. 
107 CULP, ET AL., supra note 40. 
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deadly weapon.  But victims would not expect such heavy punishment for an offender 
who did not engage in such acts, though victims would probably want such an 
offender to be punished somewhat more than would be normal for a property crime 
that occurred outside the occupied home.   
Double-counting of the violence occurs if the burglary charge is elevated from 
simple to aggravated and also punished separately, which is the case in the majority 
of states.  In this chain of events, the fact of injury to the victim is counted twice; it 
elevates the burglary charge to a more severe felony and provides the basis for an 
additional yet more severe charge (robbery).  Some might also argue that the violent 
act is sometimes triple-counted because the charge relating to the extent of injury 
suffered (aggravated assault) is added to the indictment. 
Consider first the factors that elevate simple burglary to aggravated burglary.  
Our content analysis shows that, among the fifty states’ laws, three factors do so: 
occurs in a residence (whether occupied or not), attempted or actual injury to a victim, 
and the offender being or becoming armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon.  
Exploring these aggravating circumstances can help legislators and analysts better 
understand the logic behind the perception that burglary is a violent crime even 
though empirical observation suggests otherwise.  They can also see how to amend 
relevant statutes so that only violence or possessing or using a deadly weapon during 
the course of the burglary would serve to aggravate its seriousness. 
 
A. RESIDENCES VERSUS OCCUPIED 
Logically, for violence to occur during a burglary, victim and offender must come 
together at the same time, in the same place.  It follows that this is more likely to 
occur in specific places, and that burglary of these places therefore poses more risk.  
Legislatures provide increased penalties for burglaries that, in their opinion, pose 
increased risk of contact between victim and offender—apparently, in agreement with 
the common law understanding that residences are where people are most likely to be 
and to become victimized.  The majority of state legislatures increase the degree of 
crime severity if a residence is burglarized.  Yet, if less than 1.2 percent of residential 
burglaries result in actual violence or threats of violence, as Culp, Kopp, and McCoy 
demonstrated,108 then the question arises: does the fact that the target was a residence 
justify an increase in punishment, considering that residential burglaries almost never 
involve violence?  Risk of violence is not actually violence, and in any event this 
study demonstrates that the risk is in fact extremely low.  Furthermore, the status of 
“domicile” as a place deserving special protection might be an atavistic remnant of 
common law, which apparently occasioned the old adage “a man’s home is his 
castle.”  People in commercial buildings can experience burglary victimization as 
well and are surely no less deserving of protection.   
A few states sensibly impose increased punishments only if the burglary occurred 
in an occupied versus a non-occupied structure, whether a residence or not.  While 
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be occupied and therefore a victim must be present for violence to occur or be 
threatened.  Our analysis found that 29 percent of burglaries of occupied structures 
involved actual violence or threatened violence to the human victim.  However, the 
large number of burglaries in which the target building was occupied but in which no 
violence was threatened or occurred (about 18 percent of the total number of 
burglaries)109 constitute the “grey area,” which often inflates burglary severity due to 
legislators’ attention to victims’ feelings of violation even if no violence occurred.  
Legislators can concentrate on only this group of cases and consult their state’s 
sentencing laws, asking: do victim compensation requirements specifically attend to 
victims’ perceptions of fear after being burglarized, and is counseling required?  Will 
restorative measures be helpful?  Administrators of restorative justice programs 
report that victims often report lower fear levels after communicating with the 
offender and realizing that they will not be victimized again.110  In states with 
guideline sentencing, should the burglary cases in which the offender and victim 
actually met, but in which violence did not occur, trigger application of a “vulnerable 
victim” enhancement?  Such legislative and program approaches are possible without 
elevating simple burglary to aggravated burglary just because a target building was 
occupied.  Thus, it is apparent that the actual or threatened use of violence, regardless 
of the status of the target building, should be the only defining factor that lifts a simple 
burglary into the “aggravated” category.  Even better, a state could eliminate the 
“aggravated” category entirely, using simple burglary as the base crime and adding 
separate charges of violent crime only when it actually occurred or was threatened, 
or when the offender carried a weapon. 
 
B. WEAPONS AND INJURY 
Unlike this discredited “buildings as victims” aggravating factor, surely the 
presence of a weapon whether in a house or a warehouse increases the risk of victim 
injury.  Legislatures elevate burglary from simple to aggravated when an offender is 
armed with a deadly or dangerous weapon, or the offender attempts to injure or 
actually injures a victim.  In these situations, the offender has committed and is 
charged not only with aggravated burglary but an additional more severe violent 
offense (such as robbery or sexual assault).  The present study’s measure of the 
incidence of violence that occurs in burglaries, it turns out, is fundamentally a 
measure of the co-occurrence of burglary and these more severe violent offenses.  
In that quite small subset of burglaries in which violence does in fact occur, the 
harm can be extreme.  Homicides, rapes, and assaults do sometimes co-occur with 
burglaries, and it is perhaps the popular overestimation of the frequency of these 
terrible events that causes burglary to be erroneously regarded as a violent crime.  Yet 
the acts are conceptually quite distinct: a burglary is the unlawful entry into a domicile 
 
109 Id. 
110 MARK S. UMBREIT & JEAN GREENWOOD. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE 
PROGRAMS, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM-SENSITIVE VICTIM-OFFENDER 
MEDIATION: RESTORATIVE JUSTICE THROUGH DIALOGUE (2000) at 5. 
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or commercial building with intent to commit a crime, and whatever criminal act may 
in fact eventually be committed is a separate crime. 
Legally, state and federal statutes universally make this distinction, but the degree 
to which they increase the severity levels of the crime of burglary when violence does 
co-occur or when the burglar recidivates varies significantly among the jurisdictions.  
Perhaps one way to summarize these variations is to begin with reference to the Model 
Penal Code definition of the crime and the severity levels the Model Penal Code 
assigns to it.  Recall that, under the Model Penal Code, the crime of burglary alone, 
without any indication of violence, is a level-three crime.  But if the offender is armed 
while committing it, or if a violent act occurs, the level increases to level-two and the 
crime of violence (or the use of a weapon) is charged separately in addition to the 
burglary.   
A revised Model Penal Code should recognize that burglary is seldom violent by 
providing that simple burglary alone be ranked at a level of severity with other 
property crimes, not violent crimes—in other words, as a felony of the fifth degree 
with a recommended sentence of no more than three years.  This would apply to a 
burglary of an unoccupied non-residential building.  The level could rise to fourth 
degree if the burglary was of a currently occupied residential building.  The basic 
aggravating factor is whether people were present in a home such that there is a risk 
of victim trauma and invasion of privacy, which is not evident in burglaries of 
unoccupied or non-residential buildings.   
States with laws roughly in line with the current Model Penal Code can examine 
whether they are over-criminalizing the offense of burglary if they do not narrowly 
define simple burglary (for instance, as unlawfully breaking and entering into an 
occupied building with the intent to commit a crime there), and rank this simple 
burglary on a scale equivalent to property crimes.  Of course, if any actual violence 
(or threats of violence, or possession of a weapon likely to be used violently) occurs, 
a separate crime of violence would be charged and upon conviction the punishment 
would be severe in accord with punishment for that violent crime. 
We conclude that current statutes do not comport with empirical descriptions of 
the characteristics of burglaries.  Matching each state’s statutes to the updated 
empirical findings, of course, requires judgment calls as to how influential these 
descriptions will be in affecting legal reform, if any.  That is not a task for researchers, 
but for state lawmakers. 
Should state lawmakers choose to reform burglary statutes, a sensible starting 
place is the classification and punishment of offenses based on an empirical 
understanding of their actual circumstances.  Simple burglaries very seldom involve 
violence, and when violence does indeed occur, separate criminal charges for those 
acts are added onto the burglary charges.  These are the findings from statistical 
descriptors and state statutes, but their actual impact in application is a matter for 
legislators to consider. 
State statutes could be reviewed for over-criminalization.  A potential model for 
state statutory reform could utilize the revisions suggested above for the Model Penal 
Code as a starting point, with simple burglary pegged as a fifth-degree felony on a 
level with property crimes.  Some states would raise the severity level if the crime 
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occurred in a residence at night—two elements that are both necessary to raise the 
degree of seriousness, which is roughly in accord with the minority of states that 
regard burglary as “aggravated” if committed under those two circumstances, putting 
the level at fourth-degree burglary.  Any acts of violence would be charged as separate 
crimes and added to the burglary charges.   
The policy prescription becomes clear: regarding simple burglary as a property 
crime and charging all burglaries at that level and adding separate charges for any 
violent crimes or possession of weapons that also may have occurred can take account 
of the experiences of victimization without inflating the entire scale of offense 
severity.  The small subset of burglary cases in which violence actually occurred or 
was threatened are important and, if punished as violent crimes, would not over-
criminalize the offense because they would be regarded essentially as what they are: 
assaults, rapes, and aggravated assaults, in addition to the crime of breaking-and-
entering.  This suggested statutory model is the strictest in terms of holding burglary 
to a property crime model and reducing the number of offenders categorized as 
violent. 
One concern with this simple model is that prosecutors need discretion in 
obtaining guilty pleas.  If all burglaries are fifth-degree felonies, which are the lowest 
degree of felony seriousness, there is no lesser-included charge to “plead down to.”  
However, most states have “criminal trespass” laws which constitute a lesser-
included crime under burglary; the elements are identical except there is no 
requirement that the defendant intended to commit a crime inside the building.  
Trespass crimes are usually regarded as the most serious category of misdemeanor.  
If all burglaries are charged at the fifth-degree level, which is the lowest of felony 
crime, any guilty plea to criminal trespass would be to a first-degree misdemeanor.  
Prosecutors resist such a statutory change because they prefer a felony conviction, 
especially if it will count as such in habitual offender mandatory sentences.  But 
empirical findings support the conclusion that the typical simple burglary involving 
forced entry is a felony crime against property and, if entry was not forced, is a 
criminal trespass.  These would constitute a burglary as a felony of the fifth-degree 
and a misdemeanor of the first-degree, respectively, under a revised Model Penal 
Code. 
One suggestion that takes account of the prosecutors’ objections is found in the 
Model Penal Code’s sentencing standards adopted by the American Law Institute in 
May of 2017.  Under the revised sentencing provisions of the Code, punishment 
options have five levels of seriousness rather than three.  While the ALI has not 
amended the Code’s definitions of the crime of burglary, a potential model for 
revision rooted in its empirical description would be to provide that all simple 
burglaries could be charged at the level of a fifth-degree felony, as previously 
described, which under the new model sentencing code would carry a maximum 
incarceration sentence of three years with reductions for utilitarian factors proven to 
the court.  The suggested new model would also raise the severity level to fourth-
degree upon proof of various aggravating factors concerning the target building.111  
 
111 This provides a sentence of incarceration not to exceed five years upon conviction of a fourth-degree 
  
 Journal of Legislation 31 
States vary widely in the number of felony categories provided in their criminal codes.  
Legislatures in each state could consider whether their current codes fit the Model 
Penal Code recommendations, but the starting point would be that all burglaries 
would be categorized on a severity scale as non-violent, with any acts of violence 
added as a separate charge. 
The alternate model for potential state statutory reform, also consistent with the 
empirical findings, follows the example of the minority of states which grade 
burglaries by a building’s occupancy status and/or structure type (residential), but 
begin with the assumption that any burglary is considerably more serious than a 
property crime.  This model is broader, regarding some burglaries as inherently 
violent and permitting “double counting” by pegging the crime at a high severity level 
and also charging any violent act as a separate crime.  A state which adopts this model 
will incarcerate more burglars for longer periods of time than a state which adopts the 
“burglary is a property crime” standard set out above. 
Under principles of punishment, whether retributive or utilitarian, such an 
outcome is disproportionate to the crime.  Recall that violence or threats of it occurred 
in only 1.2% of residential burglaries overall, but when the home was occupied, 29% 
of the cases within this subset included violence or threats.  Furthermore, residential 
burglaries are more likely to end in violence than are burglaries in non-residential 
buildings, though violence can and does occur in either structure type.  Perhaps the 
critical point is whether the building was occupied, not whether it was a home or not; 
by contrast, some commentators insist that the common law “home as castle” doctrine 
still describes how victims perceive burglary today (that is, as a special violation of 
privacy if against one’s home).  The content analysis of state statutes shows that the 
majority of states (34) raise the severity level of a burglary if it involved a dwelling.112  
Five others narrow this exception to the general rule that burglary is regarded as a 
property crime by requiring that the dwelling must have been occupied at the time.   
The statistical findings clearly indicate that the preferred policy outcome is to 
regard burglary as a property crime.  However, the statutory content analysis 
presented here also indicates that a majority of states regard burglary against a 
residence as a felony of higher seriousness than a property crime.  Taken together, 
the statistical analysis and the content analysis produce the policy prescription that 
burglary should be charged as a felony crime against property—or even as a first-
degree misdemeanor—unless it was committed in a home occupied at the time of the 
breaking and entering.  This standard takes account of the special fear victims 
experience when their private homes are targeted, whether violence occurred or not.  
 
felony.  MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING PROPOSED OFFICIAL DRAFT § 6.11(6)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 2017). 
112 Only 5 states allow aggravation of the severity level for “any type of structure,” and only 3 aggravate 
the severity for “any occupied structure.”  These minority stances are not consistent with a goal of requiring 
burglary to be regarded as a property crime, which is the policy outcome indicated by both our statistical 
analysis and the statutory content analysis.  Therefore, the minority approaches are not included in this 
discussion of potential policy outcomes.  The policy question here is whether a statute should hold all 
burglaries, even those committed in homes, in the severity level of property crime, or whether the statute 
should regard almost all burglaries as property crimes with the exception of those committed in homes—or, as 
a narrower exception, in occupied homes.  Supra Table 3 and Table 4. 
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It also takes account of the potential for violence to which many legislators refer when 
considering whether to categorize all burglaries as property crimes. 
To eliminate double counting, the presence of a weapon or injury to a victim—
which constitute separate, more serious actually violent offenses—would not elevate 
the severity of the burglary itself.  In the small portion of cases in which burglary co-
occurs with a violent crime, offenders would be charged with the appropriate degree 
of burglary (based upon occupancy status), and also the violent offense they 
committed after entering the structure.   
A model burglary statute taking account of the findings in this report, and using 
the proposed five-category scale in the preliminary draft of a revised Model Penal 
Code, would read: 
Burglary. 
 
Grading. Burglary is a felony of the fifth degree if the actor: 
                Enters a building without lawful reason to be there, 




Grading.  Aggravated burglary is a felony of the fourth degree if the actor: 
              Enters an occupied home without lawful reason to be there, 
              With intent to commit a crime therein. 
 
Possible narrowing: Common law required that the burglary against the 
home occurred at night. 
 
Note: If the actor is armed with any deadly weapon, or if any crime is 
actually committed in the home, additional separate crimes will be 
charged for those acts. 
 
Since burglary is a modal felony—it is a very common crime compared to other 
felonies—prisons hold a great many burglars.  Legislative changes such as this model 
statute would match the punishment more closely to the actual crime.  They would 
also have the effect of reducing prison populations as the modal felons served shorter 
sentences.  But burglaries which involved acts or threats of violence would always be 
treated very seriously indeed. 
The research reported here demonstrates how important it is to differentiate 
between property crimes and violent crimes not only to prevent over-criminalization 
but to address public and victims’ concerns carefully and fairly.  By regarding 
burglary as a crime against property unless violence was actually involved, these 
concerns are met.  And by not including burglary in the group of offenses to which 
sentencing enhancements for violent offenses will attach (unless actual violence or 
weapons-carrying indeed occurred in addition to the burglary), over-punishment is 
also avoided.  The policy implications of reforming the laws of burglary are powerful: 
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public concerns to punish violent offenders would still be addressed.  Also, victims 
frightened in the sanctity of their homes will receive special attention.  However, 
offenders who have committed crimes against property will not serve long, expensive 
prison terms.  Those offenders will still be incarcerated for committing a felony crime, 
but their sentences will not be as long as in the past.   
Reforms will not be quick, since the state laws vary widely, and state legislatures 
may be reluctant to spend time reforming their laws on such a mundane-sounding 
topic as burglary.  However, it is its very ordinariness—the modal crime—that 
presents to legislators a non-controversial way of reviewing current prison population 
levels and considering whether a different approach would be more proportionate to 
the actual severity of the crime, parsimonious in its effect on prison levels, and more 
just to the offenders. 
 
 
 
 
